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LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1959 April, 1959 Number 2
THE MEANS AND THE END
By William 0. Douglast
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the
School of Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in 1949,
to honor the memory of a well-loved alumnus and faculty member whose
connection with and service to the school extended over the period 1898-
1947. This eleventh annual lecture was delivered on March 11, 1959.
The theory that the end justifies the means is an old one in the
police state. It often lies hidden in ponderous law books or in obscure
decisions. Frequently, however, it breaks through into news that all
can understand. The New York Times for October 22, 1958, carried
the following item under the Moscow date line:
A 19-year-old "stilyag" (zoot-suiter) was re-tried and sen-
tenced to death following public protests that the original ten to
twenty-five-year term imposed for killing a militiaman during a
robbery was too lenient, the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda
said today.
The condemned youth was Victor Shanshkin, leader of a gang of
four youths who tried to break into a Moscow store last May, ac-
cording to the newspaper of the Young Communist Organization.
He pumped seven bullets into the militiaman, who tried to pre-
vent the robbery.
The four escaped, but were later arrested and sentenced to
prison terms ranging from ten to twenty-five years. The sen-
tences aroused widespread public protests.
At the second trial, held recently, Shanshkin was sentenced to
die. The other three, all under 20 years of age, were ordered to
serve prison terms ranging from ten to twenty years.'
The guarantee against double jeopardy, contained in our fifth
amendment, protects the citizen from being forced to run the gantlet
t Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1958, p. 4, col. 6.
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twice. While it is familiar here and foreign to Soviet Russia, it has
its most vivid application in England.
Recently a British friend noted that reversals of judgments of con-
viction by the Court of Criminal Appeals in England had been nu-
merous. Yet none of these defendants had been retried, since the
British rule is that once the citizen, charged with a criminal offense,
has been put on trial before a competent court, and either convicted or
acquitted, he cannot be charged a second time. A reversal of a judg-
ment of conviction by the Court of Criminal Appeals results, apart
from few exceptions, in a direction that the conviction be quashed.2
The reports of the Court of Criminal Appeals are full of such dis-
positions. Nor does a feeling on the part of the judges that the accused
is guilty stay their hand if an error of law infects the judgment of
conviction.3 My friend, convinced of the guilt of many of these suc-
cessful litigants, wrote a piece showing the character of some of the
criminals whom the English courts were turning loose. He was re-
strained from publishing by his solicitor who rightly advised him
that he would be subject to severe libel penalties for charging with
crimes those who could not be prosecuted, since in law they had
been acquitted.
This rule that governs criminal appeals in England is a remnant of
one concept of double jeopardy that does not prevail on this side of
the ocean.4 But it illustrates an important ethical lesson in procedure:
the feeling that once the government decides to bring its great power
to bear against the citizen in criminal proceedings it has but one
chance to prove its case. Though justice may sometimes lose out and
a crime go unpunished, the ends-rectifying a wrong to society-do
not justify the means-a second prosecution. This is, I am sure, the
thing Gandhi had in mind when he wrote that "means are not to be
distinguished from ends."
The means can produce their own set of evils that are as repressive
as those which one sets out to remedy. Milovan Djilas, a Communist
whom I met in Yugoslavia when he was second in the Politburo, has
written at length about this problem in his book 'The New Class. This
book, written in prison after he had come into disfavor, is the
anguished utterance of a man who discovers that ruthless means as a
way of life are too high a price to pay for progress.
By revolutionary means, contemporary Communism has suc-
ceeded in demolishing one form of society and despotically setting
up another. At first it was guided by the most beautiful, pri-
2. 10 Halsbury, Laws of England 535-36 (3d ed. 1955).
3. See Garlick v. Queen, 42 Crim. App. R. 141 (1958); Wilson v. Queen, 41
Crim. App. R. 226 (1957).
4. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure § 142 (Anderson ed. 1957).
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mordial human ideas of equality and brotherhood; only later did
it conceal behind these ideas the establishment of its domination
by whatever means....
Thus, by justifying the means because of the end, the end itself
becomes increasingly more distant and unrealistic, while the
frightful reality of the means becomes increasingly obvious and
intolerable.5
One device for broad control by Communist Russia over the citizen
was the "analogy" article in the Soviet Criminal Code. By this law
a court was permitted to inflict punishment for any act deemed
socially dangerous, even though not defined in the Code as criminal.
"If a given act which constitutes a social danger is not directly speci-
fied by this Code, the basis and limits of liability to punishment
therefor shall be determined by analogy with the sections of the Code
that deal with crimes of the most nearly similar nature."6 When it
came to imposition of sentence, the judge used as a legal basis any
article of the Code which defined analogous action as a crime.
The provision of the criminal code punishing "counter-revolution"
also had a broad sweep-"undermining, with counter-revolutionary
intent, state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation, the
credit system, or the cooperative movement by using state institutions
and enterprises or by working against their normal activities....
This was the article under which many industrial managers were
convicted during the 1930's.
Those articles in their Soviet setting were most useful to an ad-
ministration that desired to place all discontents and deviationists
under close surveillance or to put them out of its way in time of crisis.
We of the West would never dream of applying the "analogy" prin-
ciple to the criminal field. There is much history behind cases like
Winters i'. New York," which holds firm the line against vagueness
5. Djilas, The New Class 163 (1957).
The late John Dewey in The New International for August 1938, devastatingly
exposed the Marxists who have consistently held that the end justifies the means.
He wrote: "[W]hat has given the maxim (and the practise it formulates) that
the end justifies the means a bad name is that the end-in-view, the end professed
and entertained (perhaps quite sincerely) justifies the use of certain means, and
so justifies the latter that it is not necessary to examine what the actual conse-
quences of the use of chosen means will be. An individual may hold, and quite
sincerely as far as his personal opinion is concerned, that certain means will
'really' lead to a professed and desired end. But the real question is not one of
personal belief but of the objective grounds upon which it is held: namely, the
consequences that will actually be produced by them."
6. R.S.F.S.R. Crim. Code § 16 (1956).
7. Id. § 58-7.
8. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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in criminal statutes, and Morissette v. United Stateso and Lambert v.
California,1 which emphasize the importance of specific intent in
many crimes.:" We show more than an amenity to the citizen when
we avoid laying traps for him. We have embedded in the Constitu-
tion-and also, I hope, in the hearts of our people-certain restraints
on government. The citizen stands above the invalid law and can flout
it.22 Our attitude is properly one of derision against government that
drafts its laws so vaguely as to trap the innocent as well as the guilty
or that expands the criminal domain into fields long thought sacro-
scant from regulation. One reason the means are so important to us
is that in a vivid sense the individual stands above the state and can
insist on a strict accounting from it.
This attitude is perhaps best illustrated by the difference between
the treatment the Soviets give a suspect and the one we endorse and
approve.
Until recently, the following was the law and practice in Soviet
Russia. The MVD could hold a man incommunicado for twenty-four
hours after his arrest. At the end of that time the MVD had to report
the case to the prosecutor. But after making that report, the MVD
might continue to hold the prisoner another two days. In short, the
MVD could hold a person three days in all.
At the end of the three days, the MVD had to turn the prisoner over
to the prosecutor, who has vast powers, much greater than any
attorney-general in the United States. When the prosecutor receives
the prisoner from the MVD the investigators take over. They work
under the direction of the prosecutor and have tventy days to make the
investigation. If that time is not adequate, they could get a forty-day
extension from the prosecutor, giving them a total of two months in
which to hold a prisoner incommunicado. There neither was nor is
any provision in Russian law for bringing the arrested person before
a commissioner or other committing magistrate without unnecessary
delay. He need not be brought before any magistrate for sixty-three
days. At the end of that time he has to be brought to trial. The law
of Russia has recently been revised on these matters. But as I shall
show, the revision was not for the better.
This long detention has made it virtually certain that a defendant
was thoroughly processed by the end of the detention period. It would
be surprising if anyone could resist "breaking" and confessing when
he is held that long. It is hard to see how any presumption of inno-
9. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
10. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
11. See Edwards, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (1955).
12. Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572 (1886); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945).
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cence can survive that long ordeal. In Russia a summary of all the
evidence is given the court prior to trial. The judges-one presiding
judge who is law-trained and two side judges who are laymen-take
the lead in examining the witnesses. In view of the mass of evidence
against the accused, the presumption must be on the side of guilt
rather than innocence. Certainly the Soviet lawyers and judges with
whom I have discussed the problem were hard put to it when they
undertook the burden of showing where and how the presumption of
innocence entered the Soviet legal system.
The purpose of holding prisoners incommunicado for long periods
is plain: the police want leisure time in which to use the various de-
vices that eventually make most men talk. The third degree is age-
old. No nation has a monopoly on it. One who sits, as I have, on an
appellate bench for twenty years knows beyond peradventure that the
third degree," still flourishes underground in this country. No section
is immune from it. In my lifetime it has reached in America the
extremes other nations have known-from burning a suspect's feet
with live coals to drilling holes through his live teeth. These are not
standard police practices in America; but they recur too frequently
for complacency. And they commonly strike at the lowly, inarticulate
members of our communities, not at the elite.
Where lawless police forces exist, their activities may impair
the civil rights of any citizen. In one place the brunt of illegal
police activity may fall on suspected vagrants, in another on
union organizers, and in another on unpopular racial or religious
minorities, such as Negroes, Mexicans, or Jehovah's Witnesses.
But wherever unfettered police lawlessness exists, civil rights
may be vulnerable to the prejudices of the region or of dominant
local groups, and to the caprice of individual policemen. Unpop-
ular, weak, or defenseless groups are most apt to suffer. 14
India has gone so far as to make inadmissible at the trial practically
any statements given the police.15 It is, moreover, provided in Article
13. A practice "unknown in England where, to our shame, they call it the
'American method."' United States v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. To Secure These Rights-The Report of the President's Committee on Civil
Rights 25 (1947).
15. "No confession made to a police-officer shall be proved as against a person
accused of any offence." Indian Evidence Act § 25.
"No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved
as against such person." Id. § 26.
"Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a
police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." Id. § 27.
Section 27 has been strictly construed; and it is rare when a confession would
be admitted into evidence. Kottaya v. Emperor, 34 A. I. R. 1947 P.C. 67 (1946).
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22 (2) of the Indian Constitution that every person arrested must be
brought before "the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-
four hours" and none can be detained beyond that time without the
authority of the magistrate. Violation of that mandate means release
of the accused.16 He may, if he chooses, make a confession to the
magistrate. But no questioning of him is allowed even at that stage.
The British practice, recently summarized by Justice Devlin in his
first-rate book, The Criminal Prosecution in England, also goes far in
protecting the accused from the evils of detention and questioning by
the police. The critical time under the British system is "whenever a
police officer has made up his mind to charge a person with a crime."17
Prior to then he can question as he likes; and the citizen can answer
or not as he pleases. After that time, the citizen is treated as the ac-
cused and the severe restrictions of the Judges' Rules come into play.
Before any statement from the citizen is taken the usual caution must
be given: "You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do
so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be
given in evidence." Some American judges construe the British law
as meaning that once the caution is given the police have virtually
carte blanche. That is a great distortion. The following provisions
from the Judges' Rules indicate how carefully the British protect the
accused from police control:
Nevertheless, § 27 does give the police an invitation to extract information from
an accused, by whatever means necessary, to help in discovering facts which can
be used against him.
"A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding,
if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any
inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused
person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the
Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable
for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil
of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him." Id. § 24.
"If such a confession as is referred to in section 24 is made after the impression
caused by any such inducement, threat or promise has, in the opinion of the Court,
been fully removed, it is relevant." Id. § 28.
Section 162 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no state-
ment made by any person to a public officer in the course of an investigation, if
reduced to writing, shall be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial concern-
ing any offense under investigation when the statement is made, except to impeach
the witness if he testifies for the prosecution. The section applies to oral or
written statements made by a witness; but only when the statement is recorded
in writing may it be used for impeachment purposes. Emperor v. Hari, A. I. R.
1935 Sind. 145. Section 162 is made inapplicable to statements of the accused
admissible in evidence under § 27 of the Evidence Act.
16. Reddy v. Hasan, A. I. R. 1954 S.C. 636 (1952).
17. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 34 (1958).
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A prisoner making a voluntary statement must not be cross-
examined, and no questions should be put to him about it except
for the purpose of removing an ambiguity in what he actually
said. For instance, if he has mentioned an hour without saying
whether it was morning or evening, or has given a day of the
week and day of the month which do not agree, or has not made
it clear to what individual or what place he intended to refer in
some part of his statement, he may be questioned sufficiently to
clear up the point.
When two or more persons are charged with the same offense
and statements are taken separately from the persons charged,
the police should not read these statements to the other persons
charged, but each of such persons should be furnished by the
police with a copy of such statements, and nothing should be said
or done by the police to invite a reply. If the person charged
desires to make a statement in reply, the usual caution should be
administered.
When a person has been invited to make a statement and has
declined, no further invitation should be given to him unless the
police have occasion to interview him with a view to informing
him of other material which has come into their possession. In
such circumstances, there would be no objection to a police officer
saying to him-"Do you now wish to make any statement?"'
Beyond this, in the words of Justice Devlin, is the right to have a
lawyer present should the accused request it:
[A] lthough there is no express rule that a prisoner who wishes
to have a friend or lawyer present while he is making a statement
is to be allowed to have him, it is clear that a request of that sort
would have to be granted; for if the prisoner were to say that he
was prepared to make a statement only on those terms, any pres-
sure upon him to make it otherwise would be equivalent to press-
ing him to make a statement after he had refused to do so. 9
A violation of the Judges' Rules is not taken lightly. If the judge
is satisfied that "some unfair or oppressive use has been made of
police power," the proffered evidence is rejected. 20
One who puts down Devlin's book and turns to our television shows
will soon have a heavy heart. The audience is led to think that the
function of the police is to "break" the suspect and make him talk.
The importance of restraint in the use of police power, conditioned
by our heritage of due process, is seldom, if ever, brought home to our
citizens on the television screen.21 One also will have a heavy heart
18. Id. at 138-40.
19, Id. at 41-42.
20. Id. at 46.
21. Judge David Bazelon recently stated: "How widespread the practice is of
arresting on mere suspicion is evident from the fact that the police have developed
a special terminology to characterize such arrests. And the public, via fact and
fiction, have learned the terminology and even grown to accept it. I refer, for
example to such things as arresting a person on a charge of 'suspicion,' to holding
Washington University Open Scholarship
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when he puts down Devlin's book and picks up American decisions
which hold that, despite the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement
that the state afford every citizen due process, police may arrest a
person and deny his plea to talk to his lawyer until they have ob-
tained a confession.22
As I read decisions and law journals I sometimes think that judges
and lawyers often forget that the Anglo-American system of criminal
law is designed to reduce police control and increase judicial control.
The theory of our system is that the police may not arrest the
citizen on suspicion alone.23 Arrest on suspicion is anathema to us.
Our aversion to it traces from the lettres de cachet in France, the gen-
eral warrant, and the writs of assistance. Our pre-Revolutionary as
well as our post-Revolutionary history indicates the need for either
a showing of "probable cause" before an arrest is made or a demon-
stration of the need for emergency action, as when a crime is com-
mitted in the presence of the officer.
Were arrest on mere suspicion permitted, the Fourth Amendment
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures would be all
but nullified. That provision secures a person from any search and
seizure under a warrant unless issued upon a showing of probable
cause, and from unreasonable searches without a warrant. Our cases
permit a limited search without a search warrant when a person is
validly arrested.24 This doctrine is rife with danger, for it substitutes
the arrest for the search warrant issued by a disinterested magistrate.
In order to preserve that right of privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees, the power of the police to arrest without a magis-
trate's approval must be closely contained.
Even when a warrant of arrest is sought, a showing of "probable
cause" must be made to the magistrate.2 5 These warrants are not
issuable automatically, as by slot machines. There is no presumption
that the officer making the request knows facts implicating the subject.
Where there has been no indictment, the sources of his belief must be
laid bare; and it is on them that the judicial officer must make his
decision on the existence of "probable cause. 126
Our system also condemns the practice of making an arrest on one
a suspect 'for investigation,' to booking an arrested man 'on an open charge.' On
television, police'are always doing these things, but they borrow them, unfortu-
nately, from real life." Speech made at Harvard Club of Philadelphia, October 17,
1958.
22. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
23. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
24. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
25. Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.
26. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
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charge and using the jailhouse to conduct a secret inquisition concern-
ing another crime.27
The police have their work to do; and the function they perform
is indispensable. But the injury to the citizen and to our way of life
can be grievous if judicial control is relaxed and the police are given
a free hand to arrest suspects. Professors Hogan and Snee of George-
town University have made a brilliant summary of the point:
[I]t must be borne in mind that any arrest based on suspicion
alone is illegal. This indisputable rule of law has grave implica-
tions for a number of traditional police investigative practices.
The round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on suspicion, for
questioning, for investigation or on an open charge all are pro-
hibited by the law. It is undeniable that if those arrests were
sanctioned by law, the police would be in a position to investigate
a crime and to detect the real culprit much more easily, much
more efficiently, much more economically, and with much more
dispatch. It is equally true, however, that society cannot confer
such power on the police without ripping away much of the fabric
of a way of life which seeks to give the maximum of liberty to the
individual citizen. The finger of suspicion is a long one. In
an individual case it may point to all of a certain race, age
group or locale. Commonly it extends to any who have com-
mitted similar crimes in the past. Arrest on mere suspicion
collides violently with the basic human right of liberty. It can
be tolerated only in a society which is willing to concede to its
government powers which history and experience teach are the
inevitable accoutrements of tyranny. 2S
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a mandate is ex-
tended to every officer making an arrest to take the arrested person
"without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commis-
sioner .... 1" The magistrate is required to inform him of, and
thereby allow him the benefit of, four basic rights: (1) the right to
counsel ;30 (2) the right to remain silent; (3) knowledge of the
27. Cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
28. Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 Geo. L.J. 1, 22 (1958).
29. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (a).
30. The right to counsel on arrest is guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution.
Article 34 provides: "No person shall be arrested or detained without being at
once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of
counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of
any person, such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence
and the presence of his counsel." (Emphasis added.)
Article 37(3) states: "At all times the accused shall have the assistance of com-
petent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own
efforts, be assigned to his use by the State." (Emphasis added.)
Article 39 of The Code of Criminal Procedure of Japan also provides: "The
accused or the suspect placed under physical restraint may, without any official
being present, interview with his counsel or any other person ... who is going
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charge; and (4) the right to a preliminary examination.3 Under
ordinary circumstances he may be then admitted to bail pending trial.
In Mallory v. United States32 a suspect was arrested in the early
afternoon and held incommunicado at police headquarters despite the
fact that several committing magistrates were readily available. Not
until questioning had produced a confession-about 9:30 p. m.-was
an attempt made to take him before a committing magistrate, and he
was not actually arraigned until the next morning. The confession
was accordingly held inadmissible in a federal prosecution, because
Rule 5 was designed to remove the citizen, once he is arrested, from
police control and place him under judicial control.
The Mallory case imposes an exclusionary rule on confessions ob-
tained following violation of the prompt arraignment requirement.
Detention after arrest without arraignment is unreasonably long if
it continues beyond the time necessary to perform routine police func-
tions, such as photographing and fingerprinting, a magistrate being
available. Prompt arraignment offers an immediate opportunity for
a judicial officer, as provided in Rule 5(c), to determine probable
cause, so that one arrested on mere suspicion will not have his liberty
long restrained. It is, to repeat, also fashioned to protect against third
degree tactics by which confessions are coerced from suspects. If the
police can delay arraignment until they get the desired confession, the
conditions under which both arbitrary arrests and the third degree
flourish will obtain. As stated in the earlier decision of McNabb v.
United States, the requirement for prompt arraignment "outlaws
easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is submitted for brains
as an instrument of crime detection." 33
The theory of our system is that the interest of society in convicting
the guilty does not justify the use of force, false pretences, promises,
or other forms of pressure against the citizen who is presumed inno-
cent. It is indeed a use of compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment for the police to create a situation where the suspect "would be
impelled to speak either for fear that his failure to make answer
would be considered against him, or of hope that if he did reply he
would be benefited thereby." 34
It is also our theory that apart from emergency situations, as for
example where officers see the crime being committed, it is for the
judges, not the police, to determine if the citizen should be detained.
to be his counsel upon solicitation of the person entitled to appoint a counsel, and
may receive documents or articles therefrom."
31. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (b).
32. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
33. 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943).
34. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 563 (1897).
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The protection of both the accused and society is entrusted to the
impartiality of the judiciary.
The odious practice of arrest on suspicion and its relation to prompt
arraignment have recently been described by Professors Hogan and
Snee:
Nor should one be lulled into the belief that such arrests are
the exception; rather does it seem that they are the rule. In fact
there is such a gulf between what the police may do and what
they actually do that many have come to identify the two. In the
District of Columbia, for instance, not too long after the Mallory
ruling came down, the Metropolitan Police arrested almost one
hundred "suspects" in connection with the investigation of a rob-
bery perpetrated by three juveniles. One wonders if those who
sent up such a clamor when Andrew Mallory was set free had
much to say about this gross act of illegality on the part of the
police.
The observance of Rule 5 (a) would quickly put an end to most
such arrests. The police would look rather ridiculous parading a
regiment of arrestees before a committing magistrate and en-
deavoring to convince him that there is probable cause to link
them all with a crime admittedly committed by one or two. The
inexorable result of police compliance with Rule 5 (a) would be
the rapid disappearance of the odious arrest on suspicion. But
before there can be talk of obedience to the mandate of the
prompt arraignment statute there is needed both a reawakening
and a rededication. Society must reawaken to the fact that in the
long pull the rights of its citizens are only as strong as their
weakest claimant; that to wink at the invasion of those rights
when some segments of the populace invoke them is to invite
similar encroachment upon the rights of others. And society must
rededicate itself to the principle that there is a price too great to
pay for maximum law enforcement efficiency. Rigid adherence to
the prompt arraignment provision is the most feasible way of
guaranteeing that that price will never be paid3
We all should re-read from time to time No. 84 of the Federalist
where Alexander Hamilton, quoting Blackstone, reminds us how
oppressive the framers thought this practice of arrest on suspicion
and holding the citizen incommunicado was:
[C]onfinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail,
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public,
a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbi-
trary government 3 [than taking a man's life or confiscating his
property].
The relation of the third degree to the failure promptly to arraign
is just as close. The use of third degree tactics is, however, difficult
to prove because there is always the word of the police against the
35. Hogan & Snee, supra note 28, at 23.
36. The Federalist No. 84, at 629 (Hamilton ed. 1864) (Hamilton).
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word of the accused; and the prestige of police testimony usually
carries the day.
Where the evidence is clear that a confession was not truly volun-
tary-that it was produced by coercion, trickery, psychological pres-
sure, or the promise of leniency-it is the duty of the states7 as well
as that of the federal courts 38 to reject the confession. An involuntary
confession comports neither with the modern view of due process nor
with the guarantee against self-incrimination.
While all states are required by the Constitution to exclude involun-
tary confessions, none has followed the Mallory case by adopting an
exclusionary rule merely because the prompt arraignment require-
ment is violated. Indeed, the trend since Mallory is in the other
direction as decisions in Arizona,39 Pennsylvania, 40 and Tennessee 4'
indicate. The view that confessions disclose the ineluctable truth still
has wide currency. That is doubtless true of most confessions which
come gushing forth on accusation. But confessions which are the
product of detention and questioning are more suspect. "The human
mind under the pressure of calamity is easily seduced; and is liable,
in the alarm of danger, to acknowledge indiscriminately a falsehood
or a truth, as different agitations may prevail."'42 We never can know
for sure what pressures and practices were used against the person
who was held for hours or days or weeks incommunicado. Experience
shows that the issue of voluntariness is extremely difficult to resolve.
There is always the word of the citizen against the police; and the
education of the public through mystery stories, movies, and television
has been on the side of glorifying police tactics, rather than respecting
civil rights. So the submission of these conflicting versions to juries
is not apt to provide any real protection to the citizen; and the control
exercised by appellate courts when they review only the uncontested
evidence on the issue of voluntariness of confessions43 is not an effec-
tive deterrent. We also know that innocent men sometimes do confess,
that admission of guilt is sometimes the easy way out. Those are
reasons for the laws requiring prompt arraignment. Prompt arraign-
37. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954).
38. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
39. State v. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248, 320 P.2d 446, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 922
(1958).
40. Sleighter v. Banmiller, 392 Pa. 133, 139 A.2d 918 (1958).
41. Tines v. State, 315 S.W.2d 111 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958).
See also Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955).
42. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897).
43. Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945).
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ment is, indeed, good insurance that judicial control will supplant po-
lice control, that the third degree will gain no foothold in our society.
That is in effect the consequence of the Indian system, already men-
tioned, which outlaws for use at the trial statements to the police and
at the same time requires prompt arraignment.
The exclusionary rule is the one effective sanction we presently
have for the requirement of prompt arraignment.
An alternative to exclusion of a confession obtained in violation of
the prompt arraignment statute was proposed by Wigmore some
years ago:
[L]et an authorized skilled ,magistrate take the confession. Let
every accused person be required to be taken before a magistrate,
or the district attorney, promptly upon arrest, for private exami-
nation; let the magistrate warn him of his right to keep silence;
and then let his statement be taken in the presence of an official
stenographer, if he is willing to make one.44
But Wigmore's solution, without more, would represent no great
advance. The truth is that there is no system of secret interrogation
of suspects that can be squared with American concepts of law and
j ustice. The right of privacy, one of our proudest boasts, should alone
be sufficient to keep the coercive power of the state from being used
to subject any citizen suspected of crime to any inquisition, whether
presided over by a policeman or a magistrate.
The suggestion sometimes made- that control over confessions can
be had by making a movie of them and attaching a sound track has
more apparent than real promise. Some recorded accounts bear their
own telltale signs of coercion. But the making of a movie after the
softening-up period is over and all coercion is ended may well conceal
rather than disclose the truth. And movies may by their vivid quality
create the impression of authenticity where doubt should prevail.
The power of the police has plagued man from the beginning. It is
a live problem in every contemporary society.
The Communist regimes are no exception. The police have long
been important in Russian affairs-so important that folklore has
developed concerning them. For example there is a saying you will
hear in Russia whispered in a circle of friends when there is a pause
in the conversation: "In every moment of silence a policeman is born."
When I visited Russia in 1955, I found lawyers, judges, and law pro-
fessors expressing discontent with the legal system as it had de-
veloped. Professor John N. Hazard of Columbia in a recent article47
44. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 851 (1940).
45. People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937) ; People v. Dabb,
32 Cal. 2d 491, 498, 197 P.2d 1 (1948).
4(. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
47. Hazard, Laws and Ien in Soviet Society, 36 Foreign Affairs 267 (1958).
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discusses the same trend. The truth is that the Russian intelligentsia
versed in law have been quite opposed to the Communist legal system
where it made its heaviest impingement on the citizen.
They were in favor of eradicating from Soviet criminal law the
doctrine of guilt by analogy.
They asked for increased safeguards against search of a home.
The practice was for the officer merely to collect two neighbors and
enter any home he wanted. The reformers demanded a showing of
probable cause.
They wanted the presumption of innocence made explicit.
They wanted a more lenient system for the granting of bail.
They wanted an accused to have the right to a lawyer during the
period of his detention and investigation.
They expressed some demand for a jury in capital cases-a jury of
four or six.
The demands for reform in Russia have been met only in part. The
crime by "analogy" has been abolished by the new definition of crimi-
nal responsibility contained in section 3 of the Code adopted in De-
cember 1958. But some of the crimes, formerly under the heading of
"counter-revolutionary" crimes, are still quite vague. Note the crime
of "wrecking" contained in the new section 6:
Action or failure to act, directed to the detriment of industry,
transportation, agriculture, the monetary system, trade or other
fields of national economy, or also against the activity of state
organs or public organizations with the aim of weakening the
Soviet state, if this deed is committed by means of using state or
public offices, enterprises, organizations or by impeding their
normal work-is punished by deprivation of freedom for from
8 to 15 years with confiscation of property.48
The right of an accused to have access to a lawyer has been slightly
improved. In case of minors (those under 18 years of age) and all
others "who, because of physical or mental defects, cannot exercise
their right of defense themselves," the right to have counsel at the
investigation stage is recognized.49 In all other cases, the right of the
arrested person to see his lawyer is recognized but not until the
termination of the investigation has been announced.
The provisions for bail have not been lightened. Nor has the jury
trial been introduced. Nor have searches been restricted.
The proposal to write into the Code the presumption of innocence
was rejected, 51 though there are statements that the government
48. R.S.F.S.R. Crim. Code § 6 (1958).
49. Id. § 22.
50. Ibid.
51. Deputy B. S. Sharkov, speaking in favor of the new Code before the
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"shall have no right to shift the burden of proof upon the defendant"
and that a judgment of guilt shall not be founded on "presumptions"
but shall be rendered only if the guilt is "proven at trial. ' '53
The period of detention incornmunicado has been lengthened. Two
months is still the usual rule. But the time may be extended three
months by some officials, six months by others, and even longer by
the Attorney General of the USSR.- Moreover, arrest on mere sus-
picion is a feature of the new Code as it was of the old. Formerly the
citizen could be held 14 days before he was told of the charge against
him. Now that period has been reduced to 10 days. Russia remains
very much a police state.
Supreme Soviet, is reported by Izvestiia, December 27, 1958, p. 3, as saying on
this matter:
"Efforts to include into our theory and practice obsolete dogma of bourgeois
law, for instance, the presumption of innocence, are in deep contradiction to the
essence of Soviet socialist law. There were proposals to include in the Principles
of the Criminal Procedure as a principle of Soviet criminal procedure the presump-
tion of innocence in a formula like the following: 'The defendant shall be con-
sidered innocent until his guilt is established by the final court judgment.' Perhaps
the jurists can understand the meaning of such a complicated formula but great
masses of the working people could hardly understand it.
"We think that acceptance of such a formula in the text of law would introduce
irreconcilable contradictions. In fact, imagine such a case: In the very act of the
crime the murderer-bandit was caught at the place of crime. By a thorough investi-
gation, made in complete accordance with the law, the investigator and prosecuting
attorney established the guilt of the bandit, although this guilt was evident for
every one without investigation. On the basis of law and collected irrefutable
evidence, the investigator and prosecuting attorney have not only the right, but
the duty to prosecute the murderer and to take him into custody. At the same
time, according to the proposed formula, if it had been included into law, the
investigator and prosecuting attorney have to consider this bandit innocent.
Furthermore, as it was pointed out, if the defendant must be considered innocent
until the final court decision, then even the court which examined the case and
convicted him, must consider him not guilty. Absurdity of such a principle is
evident from the point of view of common sense. Is it not understandable why this
is not evident to these theoreticians?
"Therefore, the Legislative Drafting Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR made a correct decision when it vigorously rejected similar attempts to
introduce into the Principles of Judicial Procedure formal and purely declarative
principles foreign to Soviet legislation, which did not reflect real social relations
and which could induce confusion among the workers of investigation, prosecu-
tion and courts.
"Socialist law requires that the question of guilt or innocence be solved not on
subjective suppositions, but on the basis of objective facts, thoroughly and objec-
tively verified by the investigator, prosecuting attorney, and court. The draft of
the Principles of Criminal Procedure now being discussed, contains all guarantees
necessary for such thorough and objective investigation in all circumstances."
52. R.S.F.S.R. Crim. Code § 14 (1958).
53. Id. § 43.
54. Id. § 34.
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The demands for reform in Russia had one thing in common: a
desire for a rule of law which has been the great missing ingredient
in Soviet Russia. They are of interest as showing that the seeds of
liberty are sown in every country. The search of man the world
around is for justice. The problem that preoccupies him the most, as
he struggles to be free, concerns the means by which the powers-
that-be hold him in subjugation. The revolutionary seeking to escape
dictatorship and establish a government of laws thinks in terms of
procedural safeguards. That is one of the lessons from our own ex-
perience reflected in the great phrases of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Bill of Rights.
The efforts of our Bar and Bench should be toward a reduction in
police control and an increase in judicial control over persons under
arrest or under indictment. This is an important step if the doctrine
of separation is to remain a vital force in law administration. It is
important that it be such, for as Mr. Justice Brandeis once said,
separation of powers was adopted "not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." 55 One need only look to a
police state to see the force of that Brandeis dictum. Even under the
new 1958 Soviet Code, keeping the accused or even a suspect in cus-
tody is a prerogative of the public prosecutor-a matter over which
the court has no power.
A system of prompt arraignment is an effective antidote to this
evil. Our profession should insist on real sanctions to enforce it.
Exclusion of confessions obtained while citizens are held pending
arraignment is one sanction for it. A requirement that only state-
ments of the accused taken before a magistrate may be used in evi-
dence is another, provided that certain conditions are attached:
(1) He should be entitled to have an attorney present when he is
examined, for as the Chafee Reports" says, "A person accused of
crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at
any other timd." (2) No coercive tactics or promises are employed
to make him talk. (3) The appearance before the magistrate where
an apparently voluntary statement is made has not been preceded by
sessions with the police where the suspect was "broken.""
These measures seem to me to be minimum requirements.
As I see it, the only other civilized choice we have, if we reject
strict enforcement of the prompt arraignment requirement, is to
55. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
56. The Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association sub-
mitted a report on these problems to the House Judiciary Committee on May 15,
1944. It was accompanied by a Memorandum signed by Prof. Zechariah Chafee,
George I. Haight, Burton W. Musser, Basil O'Connor and H. Austin Hauxhurst.
57. See Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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adopt the British or Indian practice or a combination of them. There
is wisdom in having the judiciary and the police collaborate to design
effective controls over the questioning of suspects. The rule should
be that the police can talk freely with all members of the community
when they are undertaking to unravel a crime. The line should be
drawn when the police decide to go beyond the point of conversation
and questioning and conclude that a person should be held. As Justice
Devlin put it, "whenever the evidence in the possession of the police
has become sufficiently weighty to justify a charge, the charge is for
this purpose treated as having been made and the suspect is thereafter
treated as the accused." ' At that point all cross-examination should
cease. Voluntary statements should of course be taken after the
customary warning is given. But the opportunity to browbeat should
be taken from all agencies of government.
When I say that even the lowliest man has dignity and the right to
privacy which no one, not even the police, should violate, there will
be those who reply that the child who was kidnapped and mutilated,
the young girl who was raped, the delicatessen owner who was shot
also had rights that were violated5 9 Who remains initially but the
police to bring retribution to them?
The vindictive theory of justice is deep in most of us. The preva-
lence of capital punishment is evidence of it. Carried out logically it
should extend to the infliction of as gruesome and awful a punish-
ment to the guilty as the victim suffered. In one Middle Eastern
country the practice was long followed of putting the criminal in a
cage, suspending it from a tree or pole at the scene of the crime, and
letting him die from exposure and starvation. We have, however,
drawn the line at "cruel and unusual punishments." ' , We know that
mass emotions have few restraints, that there must be men to stand
between an accused and the mob. But these men, the officials charged
with law enforcement, must not become the mob in miniature. There
are ways of detecting criminals without using oppressive tactics
against suspects. England and India are not lawless nations where
men go unpunished for their misdeeds.6 1 In those countries the means
58. Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England 35 (1958).
59. This attitude dominates the thinking of those who control the Russian sys-
tem. S. A. Golunsky, one of the draftsmen of the new Soviet Criminal Code, is
reported by Izvestiia, December 27, 1958, p. 3, as having told the Supreme Soviet:
"the draft contains several provisions directed at the protection of defendant's
rights and the expansion of defense rights. However, the draft is rightly premised
on the idea that the most important thing is their protection against attacks by
criminal elements.
60. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
61. The statement has been made that the Mallory decision (dated June 24,
1957) by its prevention of extensive questioning of suspects, impedes solution of
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of law enforcement are not held lightly. They are closely safeguarded
so that the state in seeking to rectify one wrong does not inflict an-
other. Human experience through the centuries shows that the power
of government can be an awful yoke for the citizen. In western civi-
lization the police and the courts exist to hold off the mobs. They need
rules which keep them from acquiring any of the hysteria of the
crowd. The police and the courts need rules to protect them from
becoming agents of passion. Tyranny is not peculiar to any one
branch of government. The little tyrants of the jailhouse can do as
much to degrade us as the Jeffreys of the bench once did.
Secret interrogation and delayed arraignment of the suspect and
the accused are evils that implicate constitutional rights. Holding a
person incommunicado is an evil against which various constitutional
guarantees are erected. First, detention incommunicado stands as a
barrier to the citizen's invocation of the writ of habeas corpus which
Art. I, § 9 of the Constitution guarantees. It also deprives the sspect
of the right to bail, guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. It de-
prives one of the right to counsel62 and the right to know the charge
against him, protected by the Sixth Amendment. It makes easy
through subtle use of the third degree the compelling of the citizen
to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
crimes. Testimony of Commissioner Robert McLaughlin, Hearings, House Appro-
priations Committee, Subcommittee on District of Columbia Appropriations, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 441. But the figures cited in support do not bear this out.
Classification Per cent cleared
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Criminal homicide ............................ 96 4 88.2 97.2 100.0 96.5 97.7 93.8
Rape .................................................... 95 6 92 9 93.6 93.4 91.8 92.0 91.9
Robbery .............................................. 70.5 58.6 57.5 63.3 59.2 54 8 61.3
Aggravated assault .......................... 82.2 81 3 85 1 88.5 86.8 88.8 84.3
Housebreaking .................................. 46 3 37 5 44 0 52.6 51.1 47.2 50.5
Larceny-theft .................................... 34 9 36 1 35.2 40.5 36.9 37.4 40.8
Auto theft . ....... 31.9 23.2 26.9 28.4 38.7 34.7 31.9
Total, p. 1 ...................................... 49.3 46.0 49.4 55.6 50.2 49.5 51.0
62. When the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia on May 8, 1958,
was considering a resolution to modify Federal Rule 5 (a) by permitting a 12-hour
detention before arraignment, Thurman Arnold of the District of Columbia Bar
made the following proposal:
"Gentlemen: I would like to rephrase the pending resolution so as to make clear
exactly what is being proposed. As I read it, this resolution says:
"'Resolved, that for a period of 12 hours following their arrest, criminal de-
fendants in the federal courts shall be deprived of their constitutional right to
counsel.' We have spent a large part of this morning's session discussing how the
services of counsel can be provided for indigent defendants. I wonder what all
of that talk was about, in view of this proposal, which would deprive defendants
of that right when they need it most."
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Finally, it may result in arrest or detention without probable cause,
contrary to the Fourth Amendment.
Viewed in these terms the prevention of secret interrogation and
delayed arraignment serves an important role in our system of justice.
When we indulge in those practices, we cut close to constitutional
guarantees and may indeed trench heavily on them.
We deal here with a sensitive subject in an important part of the
public domain. The extent to which police apprehend innocent persons
has been underlined in the Foote Report 3 to the United Nations
where, in a world round-up on this subject, reference was made to
recent police statistics in three American cities-Los Angeles, Cleve-
land, and Detroit:
In the first, 41% of all persons arrested for serious crimes in
1955 were released at their first hearing for lack of evidence. In
the second, out of 25,400 persons "held for investigation" by the
police during 1953 and 1954, 67% were released without being
prosecuted, while in the third city, out of 27,146 suspects arrested
in 1955, 22,477 or nearly 83% were likewise released. When to
this is added the fact that not all of those brought to trial are
convicted, this high proportion of error is magnified still further.
I share the hope of the Foote Report that these figures do not repre-
sent the national average.6 4 Yet we must all agree that they under-
line the importance of strict procedural safeguards over arrest and
detention lest the ends-the administration of justice-be corrupted
by means which create new injustices.
63. Foote, Problems of the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and
Procedure, United Nations (1958). And see Foote, Law and Police Practice:
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 16, 20-27 (1958).
64. For a disturbing account of the conditions in Chicago see Secret Detention
by the Chicago Police, A Report by the American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois
Division (1959).
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